Financial intermediaries, such as credit rating agencies, have an incentive to maintain a public reputation for credibility amongst investors. However, in a market where credit rating agencies are interacting repeatedly with only a few issuers (sellers), they also have an incentive to develop a second, private reputation for leniency. We develop a dynamic model that analyzes how credit rating agencies can create such a double reputation. A key factor in our model is that issuers have privileged knowledge regarding the quality of rated assets compared to investors.
Introduction
The nancial crisis that erupted in 2007 exposed a dramatic failure in the rating of mortgage related securities such as mortgage backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Prior to the crisis, a large proportion of these assets received top ratings for example, 80-95% of a typical subprime MBS deal was assigned the highest possible AAA rating (Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery, 2010) . However, when the crisis erupted, these assets were severely downgraded, in many cases below investment grade.
1
Critics have claimed that rating agencies knowingly ignored risks when rating mortgage related securities. These claims have been supported by recent empirical literature.
Apparently, rating agencies ignored available data on risks when rating mortgage deals. In many cases out of the model adjustments were made in order to ensure higher ratings.
2
The failure has drawn attention to potential conict of interest in the rating agencies' issuer pays business model, and have raised the possibility that ratings were inated in order to attract more deals and increase market share.
3
One of the main dierences between mortgage related securities, whose ratings have failed, and plain corporate bonds, which did not incur such severe downgrades and defaults, 4 is the structure of the markets in which these two types of assets are issued. (White, 2010, p. 221) . Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) oer additional data on the rating collapse of CDOs and MBSs.
2 Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2010) examined a sample of nearly 90% of the MBS deals issued in the period of 2001-2007, and report that during 2005-2007 the fraction of highly-rated MBS in each deal remained at, despite a signicant increase in the average risk of new MBS deals.
In addition, MBS deals backed by loans with observably risky characteristics did not get lower ratings.
Their analysis suggests MBS ratings did not fully reect publicly available data. Grin and Tang (2009) examined a sample of 916 CDOs and report that the formal rating model accounted for only half of the determination of credit rating. They report that 84% of the adjustments to the model are positive and that, on average, adjustments account for an additional 12.1% of AAA at the time of issue. They estimate that without out-of-the-model adjustments the average ratings of the AAA rated tranches in their sample would have been rated BBB, resulting in a 20.1% lower valuation.
3 For example, the SEC report of an e-mail correspondence from a rating agency ocial asserting We are meeting with your group this week to discuss adjusting criteria for rating CDOs of real estate assets this week because of the ongoing threat of losing deals. (The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2008), p. 26). 4 Obviously during a nancial crisis there are more defaults, and therefore more credit downgrades, than in other times. A comparison by Standard and Poor's (2010) shows that ratings of assets other than MBSs and CDOs were not downgraded more than in previous stress periods such as 1991 and 2001. S&P therefore claims that the ratings of theses assets served as predictors of the relative likelihood of default even during the current crisis. their market is characterized by thousands of issuers, many of them acting only once. In contrast, mortgage related securities are issued by a relatively small number of specialized rms and big investment banks. During the years 2005-7, the peak of the securitization era, such rms repeatedly originated mortgages in order to securitize them and issue MBSs.
5 In 2006, for example, the top ten subprime MBS issuers were responsible for almost 65% of market volume, and the top 25 were responsible for 95% of market volume (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008, Table 2 .3).
6
In this paper, we claim that this dierence in market structure is a key factor to understanding the observed rating ination of MBSs and CDOs compared to plain corporate bonds. In markets with a large number of issuers, most of them issuing only one asset, reputation concerns lead rating agencies to give truthful ratings in order to build a credible reputation. In such markets, credibility is rewarding, because truthful ratings solve the adverse selection problem between issuers and investors and create a surplus which the CRA can extract.
7
In contrast, in a market with a small number of issuers who repeatedly require ratings of new deals, rating ination may occur. Since issuers are acting repeatedly, they are better informed about the truthfulness of the ratings, simply because they have privileged information on the real quality of the rated deal. These issuers can therefore spot rating ination and reward it by high fees, while investors notice that the rating is not truthful only if a default occurs. As a result, rating agencies may have an incentive to provide favorable ratings, in order to create a double reputation: the issuers recognize that the CRA is lenient and inates ratings, while investors still believe that the CRA is credible.
Due to the double reputation, the CRA is rehired for a high fee.
Our results are supported by a recent empirical paper by He, Qian, and Strahan (2010) .
The authors examine a large sample of MBS deals issued during the years 2000-7 and rated by Moody's and S&P. He, Qian, and Strahan (2010) show that tranches sold by rms who 5 This activity was known as the originate to distribute business model. 6 In a similar examination, over a sample of 642 CDOs and residential MBSs deals, the SEC reports that 12 arrangers accounted for 80% of the deals, in both number and dollar volume (The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008, p. 32). 7 Rating agencies often claim that this reputation concern is enough to ensure their credibility. the most favorable rating in its previous deals and that the CRA it chooses is less likely to rate its subsequent deals lower than other CRAs. These results support our idea that rating ination in mortgage related assets is associated with repeated interaction between issuers and CRAs.
Our model is also able to explain why the prot margins of rating agencies are much higher in the rating of mortgage related assets compared to plain bonds. According to our model, issuers pay higher fees for ratings in these markets because they expect to get more favorable ratings. In other words, the high fees are a result of rating ination. These results dier from other papers, in which rating ination is a result of high fees.
8 Moreover, the relatively more complex and opaque nature of securitized assets such as MBSs and CDOs compared to plain bonds implies that the information asymmetry between issuers and investors in such markets is greater. Hence it is more dicult for investors to realize whether the ratings are reasonable or not. This, in turn, supports our double reputation argument, which is more plausible when issuers are more informed that investors.
We develop our results in a simple two period communication model. The model includes an issuer who attempts to sell an asset to an investor. The asset is risky, and can vary in quality, which is dened as the probability that the asset does not default.
The asset's expected return is lower than the investor's outside option, and because the investor cannot identify the quality of the asset, there would be no trade unless some intermediary indicates that the asset is of high quality. An intermediary, or credit rating agency (CRA), can be hired by the issuer to rate the asset. The rating agency's fee depends on the issuer's expected revenue, which in turn depends on the price the investor is willing to pay, which in turn depends on the rating. We assume that the fee to the rating agency is paid in advance in every period and is not contingent on the rating, so 8 For example, Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2009) there is no ratings shopping in our model.
We allow the rating agency to develop reputation. Following the literature beginning with Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) , this is done by using commitment types. The rating agency may be one of two types: either it is a regular prot maximizing type (strategic), or a corrupt type, who publishes only good ratings.
We assume that the strategic type has some small incentive to be truthful, but that incentive is always smaller than its prot maximizing incentive. We dene the rating agency's reputation as the belief that it is a strategic type: a low reputation means that the rating agency is likely to give mostly good but uninformative ratings. The issuer may prefer a low reputation since it wants to receive good ratings, but an investor pays a low premium for a good rating made by a rating agency with a low reputation.
In order to analyze the importance of repeated interaction between issuers and rating agencies, we distinguish between two market structures: in the former, the issuer acts only once, and therefore there is a dierent issuer in every period. Under such conditions, the second issuer does not have an informational advantage over the investor: both of them can only observe the previous return and the rating agency's past rating, and update their beliefs of the rating agency's type accordingly. In the latter, the issuer sells two assets consecutively. This issuer, unlike the issuer who acts only once, has an informational advantage over the investor in the second period, because it knows whether the rating of the previous period was truthful or inated. The issuer uses the additional information to update its beliefs on the type of the rating agency.
We nd the perfect Bayesian equilibrium with mixed strategies for both of these markets. We show that in the former market, a strategic rating agency is always truthful in equilibrium. In such a market, because the investor and the issuer are equally informed, the rating agency always has a single commonly known reputation. In this case the rating agency would like to appear as truthful as possible, since truthful ratings increase the surplus of the players and the fee paid to the CRA.
In the second market, however, a strategic CRA inates ratings with a positive probability if both its initial reputation is high, and the bad asset's default probability is low. Rating ination in such a market is protable due to the formation of a double reputation: the issuer believes that the rating agency is corrupt with a high probability, while the investor believes that the rating agency is strategic (and truthful in the second period) with a high probability. Such a double reputation increases the expected surplus of the issuer and therefore the fee paid to the CRA for the second rating. Rating ination is of course risky for the CRA, because the CRA may be exposed as untrustworthy by the investor if the bad asset defaults, and thus suer a low common reputation and a small fee in the second period. But our results show that if the probability of such event is low enough (below half ), then the CRA prefers to distort information with positive probability, in spite of this risk.
Our analysis shows that rating ination can occur due to reputational concerns and not only due to short-term conict of interest. It suggests that regulatory intervention is needed in some markets to ensure truthful ratings. One possible remedy is to hold CRAs liable for inated ratings, as it increases the cost incurred by a CRA in case rating ination is publicly exposed. Such cost may deter rating ination if it is high enough, as it outweighs the possible gains from rating ination. We discuss regulation in more detail in section 6.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section includes a survey of the related literature; section 3 describes the basic monopolistic model; Section 4 describes the equilibrium of this model with and without repeated interaction between issuers and CRAs; Section 5 extends our results to the case of competition between rating agencies; section 6 discusses the policy implications of our analysis and section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
In the past three years the economic literature on credit rating agencies has signicantly increased as a response to the nancial crisis of 2007 and its exposure of systematic rating ination in mortgage related assets. Several explanations were oered, but most of them rely on the phenomena of ratings shopping, where issuers request from several rating agencies a shadow rating, and then decide which of these ratings (if any) becomes public. Since most of the money that is paid to the CRA is received only if the rating is published, this implies that in eect the fee is contingent on the rating. Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) These papers show that when fees are not contingent on ratings, truthful reporting is established, because reputation becomes the prominent concern of rating agencies. In contrast, our model assumes that fees are not contingent on ratings in every period, and shows how reputation concerns may actually encourage rating ination. These dierences in analysis have signicant regulation implications, as discussed in section 6 below.
In addition, unlike the models presented in Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) and Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2009) , our model does not require the assumption that investors are boundedly-rational or naive. In Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) and Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2009) it is protable to achieve inated ratings only if the investors (or a signicant fraction of them) do not realize this rating ination and accept the published ratings at face value. In contrast, in our model, the fact that investors are less informed than the issuers is enough to produce rating ination even if investors are completely rational and the information structure is common knowledge. Opp, Opp, and Harris (2010) show that rating ination may occur when ratings are used for regulating nancial institutions. Under such regulation, investors are willing to pay for a label of good rating and are less concerned by the informational value of the rating. This, in turn, may lead rating agencies to give a favorable report rather than acquire costly information and perform a proper rating process. According to our model 9 Sangiorgi, Sokobin, and Spatt (2009) use a similar argument to Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) to explain the process of notching in the rating of structured assets which are backed by rated assets, and also to explain the fact that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones.
ratings can still be inated even when investors are solely concerned by the informative value of the rating.
The closest paper to ours is Bouvard and Levy (2009) . As in our paper, they present a model where a rating agency has two opposing reputational concerns, and show that rating ination may occur even when fees are not contingent upon rating. Bouvard and Levy present a model in which rating agencies are always truthful, and rating ination is a result of underinvestment in a costly auditing process that detects bad assets. In contrast, we present a communication model where an informed rating agency chooses whether to report its information or not. Reputation has a dierent meaning in both models: in Bouvard and Levy, the rating agency develops a reputation of being strict, and its payo is non-monotone in reputation. Therefore, a rating agency with a high reputation may exert less eort in order to appear more lenient. On the contrary, the rating agency in our model develops a reputation of being informative. If the rating agency has only one reputation then it always has an incentive to be truthfull and improve its reputation, because an informative rater is associated with higher expected surplus to the players. Manipulating information is only protable in our model if the rating agency has the ability to create a double reputation a central result in our paper, which is not addressed by Bouvard and Levy.
Our paper is also related to the literature on communication in dynamic settings, starting with Sobel (1985) . Sobel has shown how dynamic concerns may lead an informed sender to be truthful even when his preferences oppose those of the receiver, in an attempt to build a reputation of credibility (in order to cash it out at a later stage). Benabou and Laroque (1992) extend that model and show that when such a sender is only partially informed it distorts information in order to manipulate the beliefs of the receiver. Morris (2001) shows that even when the sender's preferences are aligned with those of the receiver, it may lie in order to improve its reputation.
10 In all these papers, the sender may be a good type, with preferences that are aligned with those of the receiver, or a bad type with opposing or biased preferences. We generalize their model by introducing two receivers with dierent preferences. Thus, in our model each type of rating agency is preferred by a dierent receiver. This framework allows us to study the implications of information dierences between dierent receivers.
10 Ely and Välimäki (2003) extend Morris (2001) and show that such reputational concerns may result in loss of all surplus to the sender.
Finally, our paper is also related to static models of communication with two audiences.
Farrell and Gibbons (1989) present a model of cheap talk with two audiences, but focus mainly on the question of whether messages should be public (to both audiences) or private, a question not addressed in this paper. Gertner, Gibbons, and Scharfstein (1988) and Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) present models of signalling with two audiences. A sender sends only one signal, and has an incentive to send a high signal to the rst audience and a low signal to the second audience. When only the rst audience is present, there is a regular separating equilibrium. With two audiences, on the contrary, some or all types pool in equilibrium.
11 In both papers, the signal is interpreted identically by both audiences, while in our setting there is an information advantage of one audience over the other that the sender can use to its advantage.
The Basic Model Single Rating Agency
The game consists of three players: a buyer/investor (b), a seller/issuer (s), and an intermediary/credit rating agency (CRA). For simplicity, we assume that all players are risk neutral with a discount factor equal to 1.
In each period, the issuer has an asset it wishes to securitize and sell to the investor.
The asset's quality is unknown to the investor, and the issuer can hire a rating agency to rate the asset.
Assets
The buyer can invest in a safe asset which gives a known return normalized to zero.
Alternatively, he can buy the asset that the issuer oers, which has return R. This asset is one of two equally likely qualities, a ∈ {G, B}. A good asset (a = G) always gives a positive return, which is normalized to one. A bad asset (a = B) gives a positive return R = 1 with probability π, and a negative return with probability 1 − π.
The issuer knows the asset's quality, but cannot credibly communicate it to the investor. We restrict our attention to the case where the expected return of the bad asset equals E(R|a = B) = − < −1. In this case, the expected return of the risky asset is 11 Gertner, Gibbons, and Scharfstein (1988) explain why high-prot rms may not separate from lowprot ones by issuing more debt, while Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) explain why certain Black students underinvest in education.
E(R) = 0.5(1 − ) < 0, and therefore there is no trade without a rating agency (due to adverse selection). We assume that is close to one, and formally:
Assumption 3.1. = 1 + for some small .
12

Credit Rating Agency
A credit rating agency can be hired by the issuer for a fee of w > 0. If the CRA is not hired its payo is normalized to zero. We specically assume that w is paid to the CRA in the beginning of every period, in the time of hiring, and is therefore not contingent in any way on the rating. If the CRA is hired it learns the asset's quality after a costless rating process. It then publishes a rating r ∈ {B, G}.
The CRA is one of two types, where θ ∈ {C, S}. A corrupt CRA (θ = C) always publishes a good rating. A strategic CRA (θ = S), can choose to inate ratings, in order to maximize its expected fee in the next period. Thus, a strategic CRA always gives good rating to a good asset (Pr(r = G|a = G) = 1), but may also choose to give a good rating to bad assets.
13 We denote the strategy of the strategic CRA by x ∈ [0, 1], where
x ≡ Pr(r = G|a = B): x = 0 represents truthful rating, x > 0 characterizes some level of rating ination, and x = 1 means that the strategic CRA always gives a good rating, and therefore is behaving exactly like the corrupt type.
The strategic type is simply a prot maximizing rating agency. However, we present the possibility of a credit rating agency that always gives good rating. This type may be thought of as an analyst that wishes to give good ratings in order to increase its chances to be hired by the issuers.
14 We describe the reputation of the CRA as the probability that it is the strategic type, and denote the prior by µ ≡ Pr(θ = S). Since a strategic 12 This assumption is only for convenience: our results hold for < 3 and even for higher levels if other parameters are constrained. For such levels, however, we have to assume the CRA's initial reputation is above some minimum, and the analysis is a bit more complicated.
13 Our model does not allow rating deation, i.e. the CRA cannot give a bad rating to a good asset.
It is not plausible for credit rating agencies to give low ratings to good assets, since such action is not favored by either the issuer nor the investor. This intuition might be captured by a model that allows bad ratings for good asset, but also includes a third CRA type, which always gives bad ratings. For simplicity, we present the model above.
14 The New York Times reports that, as part of an overall investigation regarding the interplay between eight large issuers and the credit rating agencies, the New York attorney general is currently investigating the revolving door of employees of the rating agencies who were hired by bank mortgage desks to help create mortgage deals that got better ratings than they deserved. It mentions that At the height of the mortgage boom, companies like Goldman oered million-dollar pay packages to workers...who had been working at much lower pay at the rating agencies, according to several former workers at the agencies.
(New York Times, Prosecutors Ask if 8 Banks Duped Rating Agencies, May 13, 2010) type is always (weakly) more honest than the corrupt type, this denition maintains the association between reputation and good qualities.
Timing
At the beginning of the game, the CRA's type θ ∈ {C, S}is drawn by nature, where
Pr(θ = S) = µ. The game consists of two periods. In each period the following game steps occur:
1. Nature determines asset quality a ∈ {B, G}.
2. Issuer and CRA agree on a price w for rating (CRA is hired if w > 0)
3. Issuer and CRA observe the asset's quality.
4. CRA publishes a rating r ∈ {B, G}.
5. Investor buys the asset for a price p > 0 or refuses to buy the asset.
6. The return over the asset is materialized and is observed by all players.
7. Issuer and investor update their beliefs regarding the CRA's type.
Preferences
The investor's payo in case he buys the issued asset is E(R|r) − p, where p ≥ 0 is the price of the asset, and E(R|r) is the expected return given the rating r. For simplicity, we assume that the issuer can extract all the investor's surplus, and therefore p = E(R|r) ≥
0.
15 The investor's payo in case he decides not to buy the risky asset is zero (the safe asset's return).
The issuer's payo is p − w in case the asset is sold, and zero otherwise.
16 Since the issuer and the CRA agree on the fee before any of them know the quality of the asset, the 15 Any alternative assumption where p is an increasing function of the expected investor's surplus would not change the results qualitatively.
fee depends on E(p), which is a function of the expected rating. One way to interpret this is that the issuer and the CRA have a known fee for a rating process, which is used every time the rm asks for a rating (a retainer), but that this fee is updated periodically, according to the surplus the issuer expects to gain from the rating process. In what follows we assume that the CRA can extract all the issuer's surplus, and therefore w = E(p).
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The CRA's payo is simply its fee w if it is hired, and zero otherwise. The CRA agrees to work for any positive fee w > 0.
Repeated Interaction and Beliefs
A key part of our analysis is the eect of repeated interactions between issuers and credit rating agencies on rating decisions. We wish to analyze how the possibility of future business with a specic issuer may serve as an incentive to give a more favorable rating.
We assume that all the players in the market observe the CRA's past record: they know the past ratings as well as returns of previous assets. These returns do not always reveal the true quality of previous assets, as even bad assets do not always default.
However, when an issuer hires the CRA more than once, he also knows the quality of his previously rated assets. By comparing the published ratings of his past assets to their actual quality, the issuer can learn the CRA's willingness (or unwillingness) to give favorable ratings. This information is not available to the investor. In markets where a large number of rms issue debt infrequently, we expect both issuers and investors to have approximately the same information regarding previous ratings. However, in concentrated markets with a small number of issuers, where each issuer attempts to sell many assets, issuers have signicantly more information than investors on the quality of ratings. Thus, issuers and investors may form very dierent beliefs about the CRA's type.
We capture this idea by analyzing two opposing cases. In the rst case we assume onetime issuers, each of them active in dierent period. The second issuer, like the investor, can only observe the published rating of the rst asset and its materialized return. In the second case there is a single issuer that issues two assets one after the other. He has an informational advantage on the investor as he knows the quality of the rst asset, and can compare that quality to the rst asset's published rating. The former case represents a 17 Once again, any alternative assumption where w is an increasing function of the expected issuer's surplus would not change the results qualitatively. We specically make an assumption like this in the competitive model (see section 5).
market structure with many issuers, while the latter case represent a concentrated market, with only a few issuers (in the extreme case, one issuer).
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We denote the prior and posterior belief of player i ∈ {b, s} that the CRA is of type S by µ i andμ i respectively. At the beginning of the game the reputation of the CRA is common knownledge, and therefore µ b = µ s = µ. After the rst rating process, dierent posteriors are possible if the issuer has more information than the investor,.
When the two posteriors dier, they can be interpreted as a double reputation: the posterior of the investor,μ b , is commonly known to all players and represents the CRA's public reputation ; the posterior of the issuer,μ s , is known only to the issuer and the CRA, and represent a hidden or private reputation .
Equilibrium
In this section we describe the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies for the game described above. We focus on the rating decision of the CRA in the rst period of the game, which takes into account the expected fees and prices in the second period.
In what follows, we rst present an assumption about the behavior of the CRA in the second period. Then we nd the equilibrium for two cases. In the rst case there is a dierent issuer in every period, meaning that the second issuer and the investor has the same information regarding the rating of the rst period. In the second case, the issuer is issuing two assets one after the other, and is therefore better informed in the second period compared to the investor.
Rating Agency's Behavior in the Second Rating
In every period, the CRA is paid before the rating process, and therefore its only concern, when deciding on its rating strategy, is its strategy's impact on future fees. We thus rule out any short term conicts of interest that could arise from rating-dependent-fees, including ratings shopping. This implies that in the second period the strategic CRA is 18 A general way to represent the concentration level of a market would be by a parameter q, which can be interpreted as the probability that the issuer in the second period is the same as the issuer in the rst period. Therefore, with probability q the issuer in the second period is better informed than the investor, while with probability 1 − q this issuer has the same information as the investor. Higher q means more concentrated market. We focus our attention on the two extreme cases, where q = 0 and q = 1.
indierent to all rating strategies.
19 In order to rene the set of equilibria, we specically assume that a strategic CRA is truthful in the second period:
Assumption 4.1 (strategic CRA's behavior in the last period). In the last period of the game a strategic rating agency publishes the true quality of the assets, so r(a) = a.
It is natural to assume a truthful behavior when there are no other incentives. One interpretation for this assumption is that the rating agency has some intrinsic incentive to tell the truth, but such incentive is always weaker than prot maximization, and is therefore expressed only in the last period.
Prices of Rated Assets
We denote by p r the price of an asset that is rated r. This price depends on the belief of the investor that the CRA is strategic (µ b ) as well as on the strategic type's expected rating strategy (x). Since we assume that the price equals to the investor's expected surplus, the price equals to
By construction the CRA gives a bad rating for bad assets only, and therefore p B = 0. The price of an asset with a good rating p G is positive if the investor believes that the rating delivers a minimal amount of information. Thus, when the investor knows the rating agency is corrupt (µ b = 0), the price is zero even following a good rating. This result holds also if µ b > 0 but the investor expects the strategic type to behave like the corrupt types and give only good ratings (x = 1). It is easy to show that, given assumption 3.1, an asset with a good rating is sold for a positive price if and only if µ b > 0 and x * < 1.
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When the strategic CRA is believed to be completely truthful (x = 0), as is the case 19 We assume that a corrupt CRA has internal incentives to give only good ratings which persist to the last period.
20 As mentioned earlier, if is larger this result holds only when µ is greater than some positive threshold.
in the second period, we get the following prices:
Notice that p G (x = 0) is always strongly increasing in µ b .
Payo of the CRA
We assume that the CRA can charge the issuer for its full expected surplus from the rating. Because p B = 0 (as discussed above), this surplus simply equals Pr(r = G) · p G .
In the second period, when the strategic CRA is truthful, the issuer expects a good rating with probability 1 − 0.5μ s . Substituting 2, the fee in the second period iŝ
when µ b > 0, and zero otherwise. The fee that is paid to the CRA in the second period (ŵ) is therefore a function of the beliefs of the investor and issuer. It is increasing in µ b and decreasing in µ s . Higher public reputation increases the price that the investor is willing to pay following a good rating, and therefore increases the expected fee. In contrast, if the CRA has lower private reputation then the issuer is willing to pays it a higher fee as he believes that the CRA publishes good ratings with higher probability.
These two opposing eects of reputations are the driving force behind our results. When the issuer and the investor do not have the same information, the CRA may have an incentive to manipulate information in order to create a double reputation: high public reputation and low private one.
Notice, that when the two posteriors are equivalent, i.e.μ b =μ s , the fee is increasing in reputation. Therefore, if the CRA cannot create a double reputation it prefers to improve its reputation. When the reputation is common knowledge, the fee of the CRA simply equals the expected surplus that is created by trade. This surplus increases as the informativeness of the rating increases. Therefore, the expected surplus is increasing in reputation. For example, when both players know that the CRA is strategic (and therefore gives a truthful rating in the second period), then with probability half the asset is good and receives a good rating, which results in p G = 1. The total expected surplus is therefore 0.5, and this is the fee that is paid to the CRA.
Before we specically nd the equilibrium of the game, we rst show that in every equilibrium the strategic CRA is more truthful than the corrupt CRA:
Lemma 4.2. giving only good ratings is never an equilibrium strategy for the strategic CRA, i.e. x * < 1.
Proof. Assume by contradiction an equilibrium where the optimal strategy is x * = 1.
In such equilibrium the reputation of the CRA is not updated in the rst period, and therefore,μ Notice that lemma 4.2 is enough to ensure that the price following a good rating is always positive, since this price is positive if x * < 1 and µ > 0. Therefore, in equilibrium the CRA is always hired in both periods, because it is always oered with a positive fee.
In the following subsections, we present the equilibrium of the game in two cases: in the rst case the issuer in the second period does not have privileged information over the investor, and thereforeμ s =μ b . In the second case the issuer does have privileged information, and therefore the CRA can try and create a double reputation.
Equilibrium with a One-time Issuer
We now describe the equilibrium of the game when the issuer and the investor have the same information in the second period: both of them know the published rating of the rst period and the realized return. We focus on the fee in the second period, which is determined by the beliefs of the players regarding the CRA's type, and on the CRA's rating strategy in the rst period, taking this fee into account.
When the investor and the issuer have the same information they also have the same beliefs regarding the CRA's type. Therefore, the CRA does not have an incentive to give a good rating to a bad asset: Proposition 4.3. In case issuers sell only one asset, and therefore the second issuer has the same information as the investor in the second period, a strategic CRA never inates ratings in equilibrium (x * = 0).
Proof. Dene the optimal strategy as x * . From lemma 4.2 we know x * = 1. Assume 0 < x * < 1. It follows that Ew(r = G|x * ) = Ew(r = B|x * ). However, whenμ b =μ s =μ, the fee of the CRA increases inμ (as evident from 3). When a strategic CRA gives a bad rating to a bad asset, its type is revealed, soμ = 1 andŵ(r = B) = 0.5. When a good rating is given, the reputation always decreases if x * < 1, because the corrupt type gives good ratings with higher probability compared to the strategic type. In that case, Eŵ(r = G) < 0.5 becauseμ < µ ≤ 1. A contradiction, and therefore x * = 0.
When the issuer has the same information as the investor, the properties of the game resemble previous models of dynamic communication with a single audience, like Sobel (1985) . Because there is only one reputation, the behavior of the CRA depends on the payo as a function of that reputation. In our model the fee of the CRA strictly increases in a single reputation. Since any rating ination decreases the reputation of the CRA, the strategic CRA chooses to be strictly truthful in this case, distinguishing himself from the corrupt type.
Equilibrium with Repeated Interaction
When the issuer in the second period is the same one as in the rst period, he is better informed than the investor. The issuer knows not only the rating of the rst period's asset but also the quality of this asset. The dierence in information can lead to a double reputation in the second period. Our result suggest rating ination (x * > 0) under certain conditions as follows:
Proposition 4.4. In case the issuer sells two assets, if the following conditions are satised:
then the equilibrium strategy of the strategic CRA is to inate ratings with positive probability, and specically
Proof. In the Appendix.
Remark. When the conditions of proposition 4.4 apply, the optimal strategy x * has the following properties:
The intuition behind proposition 4.4 is as follows: when a bad asset receives a bad rating, the type of the strategic CRA is revealed soμ s =μ b = 1. In that case, the payo of the CRA in the second period isŵ = 0.5 (sincep G = 1 and Pr(r = G) = 0.5).
However, when a bad asset receives a good rating, there are two possible future payos:
with probability 1 − π the asset defaults and the rating ination becomes commonly known, leading to a low common reputationμ s =μ b < µ and a second period fee lower than 0.5. With probability π the asset does not default, and this case leads to a double reputation,μ s <μ b < µ, which can result in a payo higher than 0.5. When there is no default the issuer's posterior is lower than the investor's since he identies that the rating is inated, while the investor cannot rule out the event of a good asset that received an honest rating. However, the posterior of the investor is still lower than the prior in that case, because it is still more likely that a good rating is given by a corrupt CRA. If the probability of default is low enough, and the initial reputation high enough, some rating ination is protable to the CRA. The equilibrium's mixed strategy is determined by a regular indierence condition.
Propositions 4.3 and 4.4 together describe the main result of the paper: a rating agency may nd it protable to manipulate information only in markets that have a small number of issuers who obtain private information about the credibility of the CRA. In this case, misreporting is made because the CRA knows that the published rating is interpreted dierently by the issuer and the investor.
Competition
In this section, we explore the possibility of creating a double reputation in a competitive setup. We present a model where an incumbent CRA faces a threat of potential entrant CRA in the second period, which has some commonly known reputation. As in the monopolistic case, we analyze two dierent cases: in the former issuers act only once, while in the latter they issue assets repeatedly. An important outcome of this section is that under certain conditions, double reputation can be maintained in equilibrium under competition and therefore the results in the competitive model are qualitatively similar to those of the monopolistic model. However, when a CRA faces a threat that it will not be rehired, rating ination is less protable. Therefore, there are conditions where a monopolistic CRA inates ratings, but a CRA who faces a possible entrant gives truthful ratings.
The main dierence in the results between the competitive and the monopolistic models is that under competition the decision of an issuer to hire a specic CRA out of several may signal its private information to the investor. If the public reputation of the entrant is high enough, the issuer prefers to rehire the incumbent following a good rating, only if this good rating was given to a bad assset (i.e. the rating is inated) and not to a good asset. This is because only rating ination (and no-default) leads to a protable double reputation, where the issuer's beliefs regarding the incumbent's truthfullness are lower than the incumbent's public reputation. However, if the issuer rehires the incumbent in such case, the investor realizes that the rating in the previous period was inated. The investor therefore updates its beliefs accordingly, so the public reputation of the incumbent plunges, and the double reputation disappears. In such case, the issuer prefers to hire the entrant even when the CRA successfully created a double reputation.
The fact that the incumbent CRA does not always enjoys a high fee in cases where double reputation is created, due to the hiring issues described above, decreases the possible gains from rating ination under competition. For this reason, we show that while rating ination does occur under competition, it happens under a smaller set of conditions compared to the monopolistic case.
It is worth noting that there is a debate in the literature on whether competition leads to more or less rating ination. Some theoretical papers, such as Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2009) and Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) show that more competition leads to more rating ination due to ratings shopping (see section 2 for more details). Our model diers in that we assume that fees are not contingent on ratings, and therefore ratings shopping cannot occur. Thus, we achieve dierent results.
21 In what follows, we present a model of entry threat, and analyze the equilibrium under two possible market structures.
A Model with an Incumbent CRA who Faces Threat of Entry
We modify the game described in section 3 by adding a possible entrant CRA in the second period, with a commonly known reputation µ e . Thus, the rst period of the game is similar to the monopolistic model, but in the beginning of the second period the issuer chooses whether to rehire the incumbent CRA for another period, or to hire the entrant CRA. We keep assumption 4.1 about the strategies the CRAs' possible types in the second period. This means that the entrant is believed by all players to give truthful rating with probability µ e and to give only good ratings with probability 1 − µ e .
As in the basic model, we assume that the issuer can extract all the surplus of the investor. However, we cannot continue and assume that the CRA can extract all the surplus of the issuer, as in such case the issuer is always indierent between hiring the incumbent and the entrant. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that the CRA and the issuer split the expected surplus of the issuer as follows:
Assumption 5.1. The CRA's fee equals a known fraction α of the issuer's expected payo, where α ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, a strategic CRA chooses the rating strategy that maximizes the total expected payo of the issuer, and the issuer prefers to hire the CRA that generates the highest expected payo in the second period.
Competitive Equilibrium with One-time Issuers
We now turn to describe the Bayesian equilibrium of the model, when an issuer issues only one asset. In this case, as before, the issuer in the second period has the same information as the investor, and therefore the incumbent CRA has only one commonly known reputation in the second period,μ
The results show that, as in the monopolistic case, when issuers have no private information the CRA does not have an incentive to inate ratings:
Proposition 5.2. In a model where an incumbent CRA faces a threat of entry, in case issuers sell only one asset, and therefore the second issuer has the same information as the investor in the second period:
1. In equilibrium, the issuer hires the entrant if and only if its reputation is higher than the reputation of the incumbent (µ e >μ); and 2. a strategic incumbent never inates ratings in equilibrium (x * = 0).
The intuition behind the proof is similar to the one of proposition 4.3. In the beginning of the second period, both CRAs have one commonly known reputation. In that case, the expected payo of the issuer is increasing in reputation, because informative rating increases the surplus of the players. Therefore, the issuer hires the CRA with the highest reputation. The incumbent's fee is also increasing in reputation, for the same reason, and therefore it prefers to publish a bad rating and obtain a reputation ofμ = 1 rather than publish a good rating and obtain a lower reputation, an act that (weakly) decreases its hiring probability as well as its fee in case it is hired.
Competitive Equilibrium with Repeated Interaction
If the issuer issues two assets one after the other, the incumbent may have a double reputation in the beginning of the second period, if it chooses to inate ratings. However, there are cases where the issuer's hiring decision reveals its private information. In such cases, the issuer cannot benet from the double reputation, and will not rehire the incumbent.
Therefore, the incumbent does not have an incentive to inate ratings. In other cases, double reputation can still benet the issuer, and therefore rating ination is protable.
Formally:
Proposition 5.3. In a model where an incumbent CRA faces a threat of entry, in case the issuer sells two assets, if the following conditions are satised:
3. µ e ≤ µ e then the equilibrium strategy of the strategic incumbent is to inate ratings with positive probability. The threshold 0 < µ e <μ b (r = G, no-default) represents the maximal entrant's reputation for which the issuer rehires the incumbent following a good rating to a good asset.
For relatively low levels of µ e the equilibrium strategy of the incumbent is similar to the monopolistic case, while for higher levels of µ e ≤ µ e the incumbent inates ratings less than a monopolistic CRA.
The intuition behind the proof is as follows. Conditions 1 and 2 are similar to those calculated in the monopolistic case (proposition 4.4). They assure that conditional on being rehired in the second period, the incumbent wishes to inate ratings. An incumbent is always rehired if it publishes a bad rating, which identies it as a strategic type (μ = 1).
However, if it publishes a good rating the reputation of the incumbent decreases, and therefore it is not always rehired. As a result, rating ination is always weakly less protable in the competitive case compared to the monopolistic case, and there cannot be more rating ination under competition compared to the monopolistic case. The presence of an entrant may decrease the willingness of the incumbent to inate ratings, but that depends on the initial reputation of the entrant. Figure 1 presents the equilibrium strategy of the incumbent in the rst period as a function of the entrant's reputation µ e .
If µ e is very low, it poses no threat to the incumbent -even if it inates ratings and the ination is publicly revealed due to default, it is favored by the issuer. Therefore, it behaves exactly as the CRA in the monopolistic model. If µ e is higher, but still much lower than the initial reputation of the incumbent, then the incumbent is still preferred by Figure 1 : Equilibrium strategy of the incumbent under competition, as a function of the entrant's reputation. when µ e is low, the entrant is never hired, and therefore the incumbent's strategy equals the monopolistic case; when µ e is very high, double reputation cannot be maintained because the issuer's hiring strategy discovers its information, and therefore the incumbent never inates; In intermediate levels, the entrant is hired only following a default, and the incumbent inates ratings, but less than in the monopolistic case. There is a small region where either the rst case or the last case may be an equilibrium.
the issuer following a good rating that is not followed by a default; but, if a default does occur following a good rating, the entrant is hired. In such case, ination is less protable because it yields no fee if the asset default. Therefore, the incumbent still inates ratings but with a lower probability.
23 Finally, if the reputation of the entrant µ e is even higher, the issuer does not always prefer to hire the incumbent following a good rating with no default. Notice, that if the incumbent gives a good rating to a good asset, it becomes less favorable for the issuer: while the investor suspects that the good rating was due to rating ination, the issuer knows that the asset was good and therefore does not update its beliefs. Thereforeμ
In such cases, the entrant is hired if its reputation is higher than µ e , which is dened by
In contrast, if a good rating is given to a bad asset, and there is no default, then the incumbent has, in the beginning of the second period, a double reputation whereμ s < µ b , which is potentially very protable to the issuer. However, if µ e > µ e such double reputation disappears once the incumbent is hired If the issuer hires the incumbent 23 There is a small interval where there are two equilibria: either the incumbent inates in a monopolistic level, and is always rehired, or the incumbent chooses a lower probability of ination and is not rehired in case of a good rating followed by a default. The expected payo of the incumbent is the same in both equilibria.
following a good rating with no default, the investor understands that rating ination has occurred, and adjust its beliefs accordingly. Following such update, the reputation of the incumbent is equivalent to the case when the asset defaults. To sum, if µ e > µ e a double reputation cannot be maintained in equilibrium, and therefore the incumbent has no incentive to inate ratings.
Policy Discussion
The model's results show that reputational concerns may cause rating ination in concentrated markets with a small number of issuers. These results are in contrast to the existing literature (see section 2), in which reputational concerns always provide certiers with an incentive to give truthful ratings in order to increase their public reputation.
24
Previous literature focuses on the short-term conict of interest that is inherent to the rating agencies' business model, due to rating contingent fees and ratings shopping, as explained in Section 2 above. This conict of interest may outweigh reputational concerns and lead to rating ination. We chose to exclude that conict of interest from our model, although it obviously played an important role in the failure of the rating agencies during 2005-7, in order to focus solely on reputational concerns. This allows us to provide a better explanation as to why rating ination has occurred specically in the markets for MBSs and CDOs. It is possible to incorporate such a conict of interest into our model along the following lines. We have shown that in markets with many issuers, such as the markets for plain corporate bonds, reputational concerns lead to truthful rating. Truthful rating can be maintained in these markets despite a short-term conict of interest, as long as reputational concerns are strong enough. In addition, we have shown that in concentrated markets, where double reputation can be formed, reputational concerns may lead to rating ination. Our results therefore suggest that, in the markets for MBSs and CDOs, reputational concerns combined with short-term conict of interest encouraged rating agencies to distort information and inate ratings.
Following these results, our recommendations regarding the regulation of the credit rating industry dier to those made by existing literature. Most papers recommend that 24 An exception is Bouvard and Levy (2009) , which also nd that reputational concerns may distort CRA's rating. However, because their model signicantly diers from ours, it does not support the same regulatory recommendations.
regulation should eliminate short-term conicts of interest, 25 assuming that once fees are paid upfront and ratings shopping is be forbidden, reputational concerns can induce truthful rating. These recommendations are in line with the agreement that the New York
State Attorney General made with the three major credit rating agencies in 2008. Under this agreement the rating agencies agreed to demand upfront fees and to disclose any rating deal, even when the rating is not published, when rating MBSs. Yet, our results
show that in some markets rating ination may persist even when fees are not contingent on the ratings, and when CRAs are obligated to publish all their ratings.
Our results, as those of the existing literature, are derived by the rating agencies' issuer pays model, in which the issuer hires the CRA and pays its fee. It is commonly believed that the rating industry cannot return to the investor pays model that was common until the 1970s. However, some authors have called for regulation of the fees that rating agencies charge, and even to limiting the issuer's ability to select the rating agency which rates his assets.
A legal amendment under this line was proposed in the
United States by Senator Al Franken in 2010, but eventually did not pass the legislation process. Franken's amendment required that issuers pay the rating fees to a government authority, and that the ocers of that authority would then choose an agency to make a rating. According to our model, such a solution may indeed prevent rating ination: if the issuer cannot choose to rehire a specic CRA, and cannot determine its future wage, the CRA does not have any reputational incentives. However, while such a regulation measure decreases the incentives of CRAs to inate ratings, it may also decrease their incentive to provide informative ratings. This in turn could lead to moral-hazard problems, which are beyond the scope of our model as it abstracts from the costs of rating.
A dierent regulatory approach could be to penalize CRAs when they are caught misreporting. Our model takes into account the reputation cost that follows a public disclosure of rating ination, but assumes no additional costs, in accordance with existing jurisdiction. Until recently, the American law considered ratings as opinions, thus providing CRAs the protection of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. As a result, CRAs never lost when sued by investors or issuers who claimed that they had been injured by the actions of the agencies (Partnoy, 2006, pg. 83-89 ). As our model demonstrates, such a legal approach may encourage the CRA to inate ratings since the expected gain of 25 See, for example, Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2009). 26 See Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009). double reputation may outweigh the cost from a future low reputation. If this situation were to change and CRAs were to suer an additional cost whenever their rating ination is publicly exposed, then rating ination will become less protable to them. According to our results no rating ination takes place if this cost is high enough.
The recent nancial reform bill (Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act), that passed in the U.S. congress in the summer of 2010, can be interpreted as a step in this direction. This legislation grants investors the right to sue a CRA for damages if they prove that the CRA was grossly negligent in determining a rating and as a result contributed substantially to the investor's economic loss. The CRAs strongly oppose any legal amendment that may result in such liability. At the time these words are written, the extent of such liability remains unclear. If CRAs will be held liable to rating ination, the cost of rating ination will signicantly increase. This regulation measure could therefore resolve, in principle, the problem of rating ination.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the reputational concerns of credit rating agencies. It does so using a dynamic model of communication with two audiences. Our results suggest that reputational concerns encourage truthful ratings in some markets, but discourage them in others.
In markets with a large number of sellers who act infrequently, credit rating agencies have the proper incentive to be truthful. Presenting nancial intermediaries to such markets can remedy adverse selection problems. In concentrated markets, where a small number of frequent sellers face a large number of buyers, sellers have privileged information both on the quality of the assets they oer, and on the quality of the rating s they receive. This second level of information asymmetry creates an incentive for intermediaries to distort information in favor of the better informed.
In the model we develop an expert intermediary decides whether or not to disclose its private information. The intermediary is faced by two opposing audiences: the rst is an uninformed audience who benets from full disclosure of information, and the second is 27 It is important to note that in our model rating ination is always exposed when there is default.
However, when the signals of the CRAs are not perfect, default following a good rating may be a result of an honest mistake. Therefore, it is more dicult to discover whether intentional rating ination does takes place (see Benabou and Laroque, 1992) . The legislative amendment therefore must incorporate a legal mechanism that distinguishes between honest mistakes and intentional rating ination. Discussing such a mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper, but is crucial to the success of the legislation.
an informed audience who benets if the intermediary chooses a specic message. While
we use this model to analyze rating agencies, we believe that this general model ts many other institutional circumstances. We present two examples, one from the area of political economy and one from the area of industrial organization:
• Voters may elect an informed politician in hope that she chooses the best policy according to her knowledge. However, a lobby group with substantial political power may prefer a specic policy to be implemented. It is reasonable to assume that the lobby group is more informed about the impact of dierent policies than the voters (for example, oil companies are more knowledgeable than the average voter regarding the environmental risks of drilling in certain areas). The politician obviously aims to be elected by the voters. But if at the same time she relies on the lobby group's support (for example, as a source of campaign funding), then she faces the same problem as in our model.
• A factory manager is encouraged to report to the management any malfunction in the production line of a factory. The manager's subordinates, who are obviously better informed than the management regarding such malfunctions, may prefer to conceal such problems. The future compensation of the manager depends on the amount of trust that the management places in him, but also on the factory's level of production, which in turn depends on the cooperation of the workers. Thus, again, the manager faces the problem we introduced above.
We presented a very simple version the model. Further research should aim to relax some of the assumptions (especially of a perfectly informed intermediary), and add more periods and commitment types, in order to further explore the robustness of double reputation in dierent settings and provide a richer set of results. Proposition. In case the issuer sells two assets, if the following conditions are satised:
Proof. Assume the CRA faces a bad asset (a = B). Assume a rating strategy. We rst calculate, for a given strategy x = Pr(r = G|a = B), the expected payo of the CRA from good and bad ratings. We then use those payos to nd conditions under which rating ination occurs and calculate the equilibrium strategy x * .
Expected Fees. If a strategic CRA gives a bad rating its type is revealed and thereforê µ s =μ b = 1. Substituting this to equation 3, its fee in the next period isŵ(x, r = B) = 0.5 (a strategic CRA is known to give an honest rating in the second period so p G = 1 and
If the strategic CRA gives a good rating, there are two possible fees, depending on the return of the bad asset. with probability 1 − π the asset defaults, indicating a rating ination had occurred, and the CRA's reputation is updated toμ
With probability π the asset does not default, soμ
(the issuer identies rating ination) butμ
(the investor does not know if the good rating is due to rating ination or simply because the asset is good). Notice thatμ
Substituting these beliefs into 3, the expected fee of the CRA in the next period is 28
Eŵ(x, r = G) =
Conditions for Rating Ination. A truthful strategy (x = 0) is not an equilibrium strategy if Eŵ(0, r = G) >ŵ(r = B) = 0.5. Substituting the lower branch of 4 to the inequality and some algebraic manipulation leads to µ ≥
Notice that in order to ensure that the RHS of this inequality is less than or equal to 1, we must demand π ≥ 0.5 (condition 1).
Equilibrium Strategy When the conditions of the proposition are satised, then x * > 0. We know from lemma 4.2 that x * < 1. In a mixed strategy equilibrium the strategic CRA is indierent between a good rating and a bad rating and therefore Eŵ(x * , r = G) = w(x * , r = B) = 0.5. Substituting the upper branch of 4 and some algebraic manipulation
a CRA in the monopolistic case is calculated in subsection 4.3. Substituting µ b = µ s = µ into equation 3, and multiplying it by the issuer's share from assumption 5.1 we get the expected payo of the issuer from hiring the CRA with a commonly known reputation µ:
The expected payo increases in µ and therefore the payo maximizing issuer hires the entrant if and only if µ e >μ (we assume that if the issuer is indierent he hires the incumbent).
2. The expected fee to a CRA with a commonly known reputation is calculated as above and equals toŵ
Assume the incumbent faces a bad asset in the rst period. If it gives a bad rating its reputation in the second period isμ = 1, and it is hired in the second period with probability one and receives a wage ofŵ = 0.5α. If it gives a good rating, its fee conditional on being hired isŵ < 0.5α, and its probability of hiring is less than or equal to one. Therefore Ew(r = G|x) < Ew(r = B|x) ∀ x so there is no rating ination in equilibrium x * = 0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5.3
Proposition. In a model where an incumbent CRA faces a threat of entry, If the following conditions are satised:
3. µ e ≤ µ e then the equilibrium strategy of the strategic incumbent is to inate ratings with positive probability. The threshold 0 < µ e <μ b (r = G, no-default) represents the maximal entrant's reputation under which the issuer rehires the incumbent following a good rating to a good asset.
Proof. In what follows, we denote the optimal strategy of the incumbent under competition by x c and denote the optimal strategy of a monopolistic CRA calculated in proposition 4.4 by x m . We solve the game backwards: rst we nd the optimal hiring strategy of the issuer in the beginning of the second period, and then we nd the optimal strategy of the incumbent in the rst period.
Hiring Decision of the Issuer in the Second Period Following the analysis in section 4.3, the issuer's expected gross payo in the second period (before paying to the CRA), equals to
The issuer wishes to maximize this payo, as his net payo is simply (1 − α) · E(p|μ s ,μ b ).
As before, the expected payo increases inμ b and decreases inμ from rehiring the incumbent as a function of the history. We denote the gross expected payo of the issuer (before paying to the CRA) from the incumbent by U (a, r, ·; x) ≡ E p|μ s (x, a, r, default),μ b (x, a, r, default) .
The order of the expected payo from every history is as follows:
U (B, G, default; x) < U (G, G, no-default; x) < U (B, G, no-default; x) < U (B, B, ·).
When deciding which CRA to hire, the issuer compare the expected payo from the incumbent as calculated above to expected payo from the entrant, which equals U e (µ e ) ≡ E(p|µ e ). Because the expected payo is increasing in reputation if µ = µ s = µ b , the incumbent is always hired if it publishes a bad rating in the rst period (because µ e ≤μ = 1). In such case its fee isŵ(r = B) = 0.5α. If the incumbent publishes a good rating in period 1 it may not be rehired.
Optimal Strategy of the Incumbent in the First Period We have shown in the proof to proposition 4.4 that conditions 1 and 2 are necessary and sucient for rating ination if the CRA is always hired. In the competitive case, the incumbent is always hired following a bad rating, but is not necessarily hired following a good rating. Therefore, the conditions are still necessary for rating ination but are not sucient (if the conditions do not hold, it is always more protable for the incumbent to be truthfull). In addition, if the incumbent is rehired in any case then its optimal strategy is x m . However, if the incumbent may not be rehired following a good rating than rating ination is less protable under threat of entry compared to the monopolistic case. Therefore, x c ≤ x m .
A truthful strategy (x = 0) is not an equilibrium strategy if Eŵ(0, r = G) >ŵ(r = B) = 0.5α. In the proof to proposition 4.4 we show that if condition 1 and 2 holds, it is sucient for the incumbent to inate ratings if it is rehired following a rating ination that is not publicly discovered (i.e. a = B, r = G, and no-default).
29 Therefore it is enough to examine under what condition the incumbent is rehired following a good rating and no default.
Dene by x the optimal strategy of the incumbent if it expects to he rehired following a good rating and no default, but not to be rehireg following a good rating and default.
29 If x = 0 then the incumbent is not rehired following a good report and default even in the monopolistic case.
Therefore x satises π · α · U (B, G, no-default; x) = α · U (B, B, ·).
Notice x < x m . dene by µ e the initial reputation of the entrant that satises U e (µ e ) = U (G, G, no-default; x).
If µ e > µ e then U (G, G, no-default; x) < U e (µ e ) < U (B, G, no-default; x) and the issuer prefers to hire the entrant following a truthful good rating i.e. (a = G and r = G). In such case the issuer never hires the incumbent following a good signal, even if the asset in the rst period is bad. This is because such action reveals to the investor that a = B in the rst period, and therefore the expected payo to the issuer is U (B, G, default; x) < U (G, G, no-default; x) < U e (µ e ).
Therefore, the optimal strategy for the incumbent is x = 0, as Eŵ(x, r = G) = 0. In contrast, If µ e ≤ µ e then U e (µ e ) < U (G, G, no-default; x) < U (B, G, no-default; x) so the issuer always prefers to hire the incumbent following a good rating. In this case, hiring of the incumbent following a good rating does not signal the issuer's private information to the investor, and therefore following a rating ination and no default the issuer expects U (B, G, no-default; x) and hired the incumbent. If the incumbent expects to be hired following a good rating and no-default (and not to be hired following a good rating and default) its optimal strategy is x by construction. This holds for all µ e ∈ μ b (B, G, default; x), µ e : if µ e ≤μ b (B, G, default; x) then the issuer prefers the incumbent also after a good rating and default, and therefore x is not an equilibrium strategy.
Finally, if µ e ≤μ b (r = G, default, x m ), then if the incumbent chooses x m it is always rehired. Therefore, x m is an equilibrium strategy. To see why notice that if conditions 1 and 2 hold and the incumbent chooses x m , then U (·) ≥ U e (µ e ) for all possible histories in the beginning of period 2, so the incumbent is always rehired. If the incumbent chooses
x > x m then it is always rehired but Eŵ(x, r = G) <ŵ(x, r = B) = 0.5α. then there are two equilibria: in the rst the incumbent's optimal strategy is as in the monopolistic case x m and it is always rehired; in the second the optimal strategy of the incumbent is x < x m and it is hired only if a rating ination was no publicly exposed. In both of theses equilibria the expected fee of the incumbent is 0.5α.
30 For calculations of the incumbent's fee if it is always rehired see the proof for the monopolistic case, proposition 4.4. The only dierence is that all fees should be multiplied by α.
